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MANDAMUS; DUTY OF RAILROADS TO RUN TRAINS FOR PAS-
SENGERS ONLY. People ex rel. Can/rell v. St. Louis, A. &- T H.
R. Co., 52 Northeastern Reporter, 292. This case came before
the Supreme Court of Illinois on an appeal from the Circuit Court
of Franklin county, which had refused to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding the railroad company to operate a daily passenger
train from East St. Louis to Eldorado. The Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the lower court on the ground that the right
of the people to insist on the running of a separate passenger train
is implied from the charter obligation to equip and operate the
road. "It cannot be said that the carriage of passengers in a car
attached to a freight train is a suitable and proper operation of a
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railroad. The transportation of passengers on a mixed train is
subordinate to the transportation of freight. Railroad corporations
are bound to the exercise of the highest degree of care and dili-
gence in the conduct of their business. But there are necessary
differences between passenger and freight trains; and, although
a limited discretion may be exercised as to what rolling stock and
equipment are necessary for the suitable and proper operation of a
railroad carrying passengers, the legitimate exercise of this discre-
tion begins only when the mode of carrying passengers is distinct
from the mode of carrying freight." In this last sentence we
have the gist of the decision, and the court skilfully led up to it
with the statements about the charter obligation to operate the road
suitably and properly, in order to avoid the general rule that the
court will not interfere with the management of railways in these
respects except where the act sought to be enforced is specific, and
the right to its performance in the manner proposed clear and
undoubted.
A new duty is hereby imposed upon railroad companies-one
which, if they are rigorously obliged to fulfil it, will put some of
them to great inconvenience. The Illinois court qualified their de-
cision by declaring that the expense of running a train especially
for passengers should be justified by the amount of business done
on the particular line of road over which the daily passenger train
is to be run. This qualification, however, is shorn of much of its
effect by the court's refusal to give weight to the allegation that the
Eldorado line, considered separately, did not earn enough to justify
the expense of running a daily passenger train. The court re-
marked: "The appellee operates its main road.and its leased
branches [one of which was the Eldorado line] as one system,
and, as thus operated, the main road and its branches yield the net
yearly income of about $6oo,ooo." "The whole business of the
various parts operated as one line should be taken into considera-
tion." Therefore, "a small part of the continuous line, which
happens to run through a section of country where the freight is
not so much and the passengers are not so many as on some other
parts of the line," cannot be taken by itself and the train service
regulated accordingly.
This decision may be justified by the conditions of transporta-
tion in Illinois and Missouri, but we doubt whether it is applicable
throughout the whole country. The reasonableness of the require-
ment should be scrutinized in each particular case, and to deter-
mine judicially that a daily passenger train is the minimum of
service that a railroad company may provide for those who ride
on its line seems likely to result sometimes in injustice to the com-
pany, and ultimately to harm some sections of the people. Pros-
perous railroad companies will be slower to extend their branches
into untapped country districts if they are to be forced to operate
according to a rule of law which fails to take into account the cir-
cumstances of the case and the comparative necessity of transpor-
tation facilities.
There are few cases at all like the one under consideration, but
their very rarity shows the reluctance of the courts to issue a writ
,of mandamus prescribing the performance of certain actions to
quasi-public corporations. They hardly ever take any steps before
requiring the clearest proof that it was intended by the legislature
to make the corporation actively perform the alleged duty. In re
The New Brunswick and Canada R. Co., 17 New Brunswick (I
Pugsley & Burbidge) 667 (1878), is a case frequently cited as de-
ciding that a railroad company can be compelled to run daily trains
over its line. This duty, however, was especially imposed by the
statute under which the Canadian Railway was incorporated, and,
besides, from what appears in the report, the company was held to
comply with this express stipulation by running daily over its line
a mixed train, just as the Missouri Company was doing before the
writ of mandamus issued against it. The case of The Ohio &
Missirsipi Railway CompOany v. The People, 120 Ill. 200 (1887),
while somewhat different in its facts, is against the position now
taken by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The statement in that
case, that "a company running a daily passenger train each way
over an unprofitable road certainly does fully as much as the law
requires of it, so far as passenger trains are concerned," should not
be taken, as it is by the present Supreme Court, to hold affirma-
tively that a daily passenger train is always required to be run.
For in the case decided in 1887 the railroad was running already
a daily passenger train, and the court was merely stating that the
railroad was furnishing sufficient service-not that it was furnishing
too little or just enough to pass muster. It is to be remarked, also,
that the mandamus was refused in the former case, and that the
court then used the following language: "It is believed no case
can be found which, in the absence of a statutory requirement, has
gone to the length of holding that a railway company may be com-
pelled by mandamus to increase the number of trains on its road,
or to run daily a particular number of trains over its road; and we
are satisfied there is no common law authority for making such an
order." Now, since the same remarks apply equally to a man-
damus to run a daily train for passengers only over a railroad line,
we are inclined to think that the reasonableness of the requirement
of passenger service may be seriously questioned.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ACTION FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAM-
AGES; CONTRACT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS. In AKuht
v. Chicago &- Northwestern Ry. Co., 77 N. W. 155 (Wisconsin,
Nov. I, 1898), a railroad company with proper authority, having
constructed its track on a public street, afterwards sold out to
another company, which agreed to pay all its existing debts, lia-
bilities and obligations. A property owner along the line of the
road, entitled to damages because of the obstruction to the street,
instituted suit against the second company. It was pleaded in de-
fence that the statutory period had elapsed during which the action
410 NOTES.
NOTES.
might have been maintained. The agreement of the company to
assume, among other responsibilities, the liability of the original
company to the plaintiff, was, however, held to constitute a new
and independent contract for his bdnefit, which the running of the
statute against the former company could not defeat.
With due respect to the learned judges who are responsible for
the above decision, there seems to be no authority for their posi-
tion. A person whose property has been injured in the exercise of
eminent domain has the right to proceed under the special statutes
giving him a remedy, or by the common law action of trespass- if
the injury is one within its application. In either case the wrong
is not a breach of contract.
The measure of damages is the difference between the value of
the land immediately before such construction and immediately
after its substantial completion: Railroad Co. v. Burson, 61 Pa. 369
(1869). Upon such completion the damages are at once recover-
able, and must all be recovered in one action: Railroad Co. v. Mc-
Auley, 121 Ill. 16o (1887); Lyles v. Railroad CO., 73 Tex. 95
(x889) ; Lohr v. Railroad Co. io N. E. (N. Y.) 528 (1887).
The English cases have confined the exceptions to the rule that no
person can become entitled to any rights under, or demand the
performance of, a contract to which he is not a party to its nar-
rowest limits. See Pollock on Contracts, 196 et seq., and Anson
on Contracts, 212 e seq. The broadest accepted statement of the
rule in this country is, that a party may maintain assumpsit on a
parol promise made to another for his benefit. Judge Bigelow (on
whose statement of the principle in Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337
(1851), the court seems to have relied), in his book on Torts, p.
619, upon the cases of telegraphic dispatches, contends that the
action is not ex-conlraclu, but founded on the wrong of which the
contract is the occasion. An examination of the authorities, how-
ever, fails to disclose any decisions which may be regarded as sus-
taining a broader proposition than that which extends the right to
all actions where assumpsit may be maintained.
In Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337 (1851), Bigelow, J., said:
"Upon the principle of law, long recognized and clearly estab-
lished in this commonwealth, that where one person, for a valuable
consideration, engages with another, by simple contract, to do
some act for the benefit of a third, the latter, who would enjoy
the benefit of the act, may maintain an action for the breach of
such engagement. In the case of Carnegie v. 'oaruison, 2 Met.
381, all the authorities are fully reviewed in the opinion of the
court, and the rule of law clearly vindicated and established. It
does not rest upon the ground of any actual or supposed relation-
ship between the parties, as some of the cases would seem to in-
dicate, nor upon the reason that the defendant, by entering into
such an agreement, has impliedly made himself the agent of the
plaintiff, but upon the broader and more satisfactory basis that the
law, operating on the act of the parties, creates the duty, estab-
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lishes the priority, and implies the promise and the obligation on
which the action is founded." The facts were that the plaintiff
had leased his premises to one who subsequently surrendered them
to a 'third person, who thereupon agreed with his vendor to pay
the rent to the landlord, and it was held that the landlord, who ac-
quiesced in his possession, was entitled to recover on this promise.
In the case under discussion the contract was not the occasion of
the injury, and the telegraphic dispatch cases are not relevant.
"Where an action rests upon a promise, a new promise or acknowl-
edgment of indebtedness so absolute that from it a promise to pay
may be implied, will start the statute of limitations afresh. But in
case of a tort, an admission that it was committed within six years
cannot make the party guilty of committing it afresh:" L3 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, 749; Oothout v. Thompson, 2o Johns (N.Y.)
277 (1823) ; Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 16 Ga. 114 (854) ; Galla-
gher v. Hollingsworth, 3 H. & M. (Md.) 122 (i793); Brandy.
Longstreth, I N. Y. 325 (1857) ; FHrtz v. Shade, 9 Hun. (N.Y.)
145 (1876); Armstrong v. Swan, io9 Pa. 177 (1885) ; Ott v.
Whitworth, 8 Hump. (Tenn.) 494 (1847) ; Hurst v. Parker, i
B. & Aid. 92 (I818) ;, Taeevur'v. Stuart, 6 B. & C. 303 (1827);
Morton v. Chandler, 8 Me. 9 (1831) ; Whitehead v. Howard, 2
B. & B. 372 (1823) ; Short v. AfcCarthy, 3 B. & Aid. 626 (1820).
In Hurst v. Parker, i B. & Ald. 92 (i818), cited with ap-
provalin Oothoutv. mPson, 20 Johns (N. Y.) 279 (1823), "in
trespass for breaking and entering coal mines and taking away
coal," there was a plea of the statute of limitations and replication
thereto in the affirmative. At the trial no evidence was given to
show that the trespass was actually committed within six years. It
was held that evidence of a promise to make compensation by the
defendant before the commencement of the action, and when he
was threatened with an action for taking away coal, was not suffi-
cient to support this issue, by which the plaintiff was bound to
prove the affirmative that he had a good cause of action within six
years of the commencement of the suit. It has, nevertheless, been
held, in an action founded in tort, that a distinct promise to pay,
provided plaintiff would not bring suit, might operate by way of
estoppel, but'not to revive the dead tort: Armstrong v. Levan,
1o9 Pa. 177 (x885).
The present case must also be distinguished from one where the
railroad company had executed its bond to the injured property
owner. By the acceptance of the bond the acts of such company
are made lawful, and the property owner is relegated to an action
upon the bond: Kellerv. Railroad Co., x5i Pa. 67 (1892). A
change in ownership of the railroad property neither revives the
old nor creates a new cause of action: Frankle v. Jackson, Re-
ceiver, 30 Fed. 398.
